From “Refusing to Take the High Road” to “Institutional Resilience”: What Hong Kong Needs Is Not Slogans, but the Ability to Deliver on Each and Every Promise

By Dr. Chen Chengyu

The Hongfu Yuan investigation took a year to complete, and society has finally begun to call for long-overdue reforms. But the real issue isn’t whether the report has been released; it’s this: Given that there is clearly room for action, why aren’t the reasons for taking or not taking each specific measure explained in detail? This question applies equally to the 924.8 billion pension fund, the 3 trillion Northern Metropolis project, the 11 SKIES initiative, and SME credit. These five issues may seem unrelated, but they all stem from the same root cause of governance: Hong Kong does not lack proposals; what it lacks is an accountability system that explains each proposal in detail, sets timelines, and accepts scrutiny.

I. Defusing the Permanent Pension Crisis: Five Tools, Four Risks—The Government Should Provide a Detailed Account of Each

The pension liability for civil servants under the old system has exceeded 924.8 billion yuan, with annual pension expenditures surpassing 50 billion yuan. Combined with nearly 170 billion yuan in civil servant salaries, this ties up nearly 20 percent of the government’s recurring expenditures. The Hong Kong Civil Servants’ Association used the analogy of “Mom saving your red envelope money” for you. To young people currently struggling with down payments and student loans, this sentiment sounds particularly jarring—because this “red envelope” is, in essence, an unfunded liability that will be footed by taxpayers today and in the future.

But the key issue isn’t “envy”; it’s this: When there are clearly multiple legitimate avenues, why not explain each one in detail?

To control cost increases, tightening the “Satisfactory” performance evaluation criteria in the Civil Service Regulations and linking pay grade advancement to performance could prevent approximately 2.3 billion yuan in additional costs in the first year, with compound savings reaching 20 to 25 billion yuan over ten years; the risk is that this may undermine frontline morale, so a phased transition is necessary. Regarding alternative options, Section 18A of the Pensions Ordinance has long authorized conversion; a voluntary transfer scheme could be established, with withdrawal limits and arrangements for public annuities. The risks include longevity risk and pension fraud; therefore, withdrawal limits must be set, and remaining balances should be directed toward public annuities. Regarding locked-up assets, bond issuance for replacement constitutes a cash flow restructuring rather than an accounting savings; the key condition is that the fund’s return must exceed the cost of issuing bonds. The risk is that if returns fall short, debt repayment will be delayed and compounded by market risks; therefore, this approach should not be forced through. Regarding efficiency-based restructuring, a 1:95 ratio of senior management to frontline staff yields limited fiscal benefits but offers the highest political legitimacy; the risk is that excessive cuts could severely impair administrative efficiency. As for financial transparency, publishing the annual cash flow schedule for the 924.8 billion figure—while not resulting in on-paper savings—serves as the political prerequisite for all reforms.

None of these five measures requires an interpretation of the law, and none violates the spirit of the contract. However, they vary in their level of controversy: the release of a public cash flow schedule is low-controversy and can be implemented immediately; the “jump-point” reform and conversion arrangements are high-controversy and require consensus; while bond issuance and the replacement of public works with efficiency improvements depend on market conditions and political timing. If the government merely states that “statutory commitments cannot be altered” and that “natural attrition will decrease,” but fails to disclose the actuarial assumptions, explain each trade-off item by item, or establish a timeline, it is difficult to consider this a full assumption of responsibility. The indicators the government should disclose should include, at a minimum: annual cash flows; the conversion participation rate and principal repayment cycle; and bond issuance return assumptions and sensitivity analyses.

II. Beijing’s Development: Speed Is There—But What About Institutional Resilience?

With a total investment of 3 trillion, the Northern Metropolis project is the largest infrastructure project in Hong Kong’s history. On the surface, the achievements appear impressive: the Bill was gazetted in 2026, more than 90 tech companies have moved into the Hetao area, and the bidding for the Hung Shui Kiu district has closed. However, “meeting expectations” does not mean “all is well.”

Three major risks cannot be overlooked. First, the domino effect of infrastructure delays: the seven contracts for Kwu Tung North and Fanling North are 10 to 20 months behind schedule, and the lag in underground utility network construction is directly delaying occupancy. Second, structural imbalances in the area’s development—the Hung Shui Kiu pilot project requires developers to operate technology sites for 50 years, and three plots are projected to incur long-term losses. With residential costs exceeding 15 billion yuan, the risk of failed bids is very real. Third, the disparity in the pace of industry development—with the government enthusiastic but the private sector lukewarm—means that if industries fail to take root before residential units are occupied, North District risks becoming a “dormitory town.”

A deeper issue lies in the institutional framework. Under the “One Country, Two Systems, Three Jurisdictions” framework, cross-border PPPs face five major obstacles: uncertainty regarding the application of laws, conflicts over regulatory authority, restrictions on cross-border financing, tax inconsistencies, and inadequate dispute resolution mechanisms. These issues cannot be resolved by mere calls to “speed things up”; they require systematic solutions such as coordinated regulatory mechanisms, standardized contracts, and one-stop dispute resolution platforms. At the same time, the construction industry faces a severe aging workforce, with workers averaging between 46 and 50 years of age, and the number of new skilled workers having fallen by nearly 30 percent compared to a decade ago. Relying solely on foreign labor and subsidies represents a “patchwork approach”; what is needed is a comprehensive talent development ecosystem spanning from vocational education to certification.

The true test for Beijing lies not in whether it is perfect, but in whether we have mechanisms in place to turn every “deviation from expectations” into a learning opportunity. The government should first present three reports: an accountability table for key approval timelines, a risk assessment of district-level land tenders, and progress indicators for industrial implementation. If the self-sufficiency rate for employment falls below 40 percent for two consecutive years, a mechanism for adjusting industrial land use should be triggered to prevent the risk of “dormitory cities” at the source.

III. 11 SKIES: From Case-by-Case Responses to the Reconstruction of Spatial Strategy

With the return of 11 SKIES to the Airport Authority, public attention has focused on the “70 billion loss,” yet the window of opportunity for strategic spatial restructuring has been missed. Where does the room for maneuver lie? The Airport Authority should take the lead in coordinating this project with Beijing, Macau, and the Greater Bay Area: Beijing would serve as the industrial hinterland, while 11 SKIES would function as an international showcase; accountable metrics such as passenger conversion rates and employment self-sufficiency rates should be established; and the accommodation ecosystem should evolve from a single high-end model to a multi-tiered structure featuring aviation-themed accommodations, cultural boutique lodgings, and youth hostels.

What has the government done? The Airport Authority has regained control, which is a step in the right direction. What hasn’t been done? Specific collaboration metrics and a timeline for outsourcing management have yet to be announced. What is the cost of inaction? 11 SKIES risks becoming an isolated shopping mall, and Beidou enterprises would lose their international showcase. What metrics should be made public? They should include, at a minimum: the percentage of visitors arriving at 11 SKIES via the Hong Kong–Shenzhen Western Rail Link or the Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macao Bridge; the percentage of Beidou residents in relevant job positions; and the percentage of transit passengers who shop or stay at 11 SKIES.

More fundamentally, there is a systemic gap: the Airport Authority is currently not included in the Audit Commission’s regular value-for-money audits. In the six months ending September 30, 2025, the Airport Authority’s net profit fell 18% year-over-year, with interest-bearing debt totaling 144.1 billion yuan and net debt standing at 115.1 billion yuan. The Legislative Council’s Finance Committee should formally request that the Audit Commission submit a feasibility report to address this institutional gap. This is not a remedy; it is a strategic move.

IV. Credit for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises: Immediate Actions Within the Regulatory Authorities’ Jurisdiction

The current credit scoring system is unable to recognize the label “the government has assumed 90% of the risk,” and instead counts the full 1 million in contractual obligations as the business owner’s personal debt, causing the credit rating of business owners whose actual risk exposure is only 100,000 to plummet. The Hong Kong Monetary Authority’s *Regulatory Policy Manual* has long acknowledged that such data is “of little help,” but banks’ reporting logic is inconsistent: 100% guarantees are exempt from reporting, while 90% guarantees are reported in full.

Where is the room for action? The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) issued a circular to standardize reporting criteria for “partially guaranteed loans”; the credit database added a “guarantee ratio/risk sharing” field; and oversight of joint liability in outsourced debt collection was strengthened. What has the government done? The HKMA has stated it would study the matter, but no unified guidelines have been issued. What has not been done? No circular has been issued, no new field has been added, and no review of the regulation of outsourced debt collection has been conducted. What is the cost of inaction? The original intent of the policy was risk-sharing, but due to inconsistent reporting, it has become a catalyst for destroying business owners’ personal credit. What metrics should be disclosed? At a minimum, they should include: banks’ compliance rates, processing timelines for dispute referral mechanisms, and the number of complaints regarding outsourced debt collection.

This is something that falls within the regulatory authorities’ purview and can be done without amending the law; it is also a low-controversy reform that can be implemented immediately.

V. Hongfu Yuan: A Roadmap for Reform, Not Just a Slogan

The Hongfu Yuan investigation report highlights deep-rooted problems such as the criminalization of bid-rigging and the restructuring of the regulatory framework. Where is the room for action? Establish clear timelines, assign responsible parties, and set a legislative agenda regarding the criminalization of bid-rigging, the restructuring of the regulatory framework, and accountability for departmental dereliction of duty. What has the government done? The report has been released, and accountability proceedings against some officials have begun. What has not been done? We have yet to see a roadmap for implementation or regular progress updates. What is the cost of inaction? “Reports without accountability” reduce calls for reform to empty rhetoric. What metrics should be made public? They should include, at a minimum: a legislative timeline, progress on investigations into departmental dereliction of duty, and milestones for the restructuring of the regulatory framework.

Conclusion: Institutionalize the “item-by-item accounting” system; the government should first disclose its three sets of accounts

Five issues, one central theme: Hong Kong does not lack solutions; what it lacks is the political will to outline each solution in detail, set a timeline, and be held accountable.

Furthermore, the practice of “item-by-item accountability” itself should be institutionalized. We propose establishing an “Annual Accountability Report on Major Mandatory Expenditures and Large-Scale Projects,” requiring the government to submit a standardized accountability report to the Legislative Council each year. This report should cover pension cash flows, risks associated with the progress of the Northern Metropolis project, the implementation of cross-border PPPs, credit disputes involving small and medium-sized enterprises, progress on the Hung Fuk Court reform, accompanied by three columns: “low-controversy, immediately actionable items,” “high-controversy items requiring consensus,” and “unimplemented items and reasons.” This would elevate the process from “criticizing government inaction” to “designing an accountability system.”

The timeline can be divided into three phases. Immediate Actions (0 to 6 months): Disclose the annual cash flows and actuarial assumptions for the 924.8 billion pension fund; the Hong Kong Monetary Authority issues a circular on SME credit reporting; the Northern District establishes an accountability matrix for key approval timelines; and announces a roadmap for implementing reforms at Hung Fuk Court. Short-term (6 to 18 months): Submit a proposal to the Legislative Council linking pay raises to performance; conduct a consultation on the detailed rules for voluntary pension conversion; incorporate the feasibility report into the Audit Commission’s scope; draft implementation rules for cross-border public-private partnerships (PPPs). Medium-term (18 to 36 months): Optimize the bidding mechanism for the North District; institutionalize the intergenerational fiscal impact assessment; plan an ecosystem for talent development in the construction industry; submit the first annual accountability report to the Legislative Council.

Failing to act or provide an explanation when action is possible does not constitute taking responsibility; choosing not to act when action is possible, but publicly explaining the trade-offs, proposing alternative solutions, and setting a timeline—only then can it barely be considered “passive but responsible.” True accountability lies in the government itself laying out three sets of accounts—the pension cash flow account, the Beidou project progress and risk account, and the SME credit reporting dispute account—rather than leaving it to the public to defuse these crises on its behalf.

Data speaks the truth—not because the numbers are large enough, but because they stand up to scrutiny; reform must be timely—not because the slogans are loud enough, but because if we delay for another year, the snowball will grow even larger.

(The author is a consulting expert at the Jianghai Grassroots Legislative Liaison Office of the Legislative Affairs Commission of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress.)

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